Waterloo Orders of Battle

Supporting articles in Strategy & Tactics #292 and #293
and the games Wellington’s Victory and Napoleon’s Last Battles
A Note on Organizations

Each army did not reach the field at Mont Saint Jean). The battle was fought by three armies: the French Army of the North, the Allied (British-Netherlands-German) Army of the Low Countries, and the Prussian Army of the Lower Rhine. The following is an order of battle of those units that actually took part in the battle (substantial portions of each army did not reach the field at Mont Saint Jean).

A Note on Unit Numbers

As far as possible units are presented below within the official hierarchical structure of their parent army. There is a tendency to see this organizational formality as an operational straitjacket. These armies however, were composed of trained (if not necessarily experienced) troops, with well-appointed command structures peopled by leaders possessing years of experience over the previous two decades of war. Even small units were led by competent men capable of conceiving and taking independent action, and of cooperating with other units and leaders not part of their immediate organization.

Basic Unit Types

There were two primary ways of stating the size of an army at the time. The first was a straightforward numerical count of infantrymen, cavalrymen, and cannon. The other method dated back more than a century and counted combat units: infantry battalions, cavalry squadrons, and artillery batteries. In many respects the older form is the more precise, because an army consists of discrete units of maneuver. At a given point of contact, the numerical size of a given unit was secondary to its existence; the mere fact of it being present put a piece of ground in contention. Both forms will be used in this article.

Infantry battalions, which may or may not have belonged to a regiment, numbered anywhere from 150 to 1,200 men. Most countries preferred a size in the 750- to 1,000-man range: big enough to give it heft on the battlefield and absorb some losses, but still within the ability of one man to control with drums, flags, and mounted orderlies. Battalions had anywhere from four to ten companies. Most companies were “center” companies, composed of ordinary infantrymen. Many countries had specialist companies in every battalion: light companies, trained to fight in open order (for skirmishing and increasingly for manning the firing line), and grenadier companies, composed of the battalion’s best fighters and intended to lead attacks and last-ditch defenses.

The basic cavalry organization was the regiment, formed of companies (not yet called “troops”) paired to make squadrons, the cavalry analog to the battalion. There was more uniformity in squadron size, almost every army aiming for a strength of about 150 men as the ideal compromise between combat power and ease of control. So important was this size that cavalry regiments routinely combined weakened units in the field to maintain squadron strength.

Artillery batteries also were called companies: the term “battery” referred to cannon in firing position, but increasingly was used to describe the company itself, and this modern practice will be followed in this article for clarity. Most batteries had either three or four two-cannon sections. The terms “cannon” and “gun” are often, but incorrectly, used interchangeably. The most common cannon was a gun, a low-trajectory, direct-fire weapon identified by the weight of its solid shot, such as “6-pounders.” The remaining cannon were howitzers, less powerful weapons better for firing explosive shell, and capable of firing at a higher trajectory. Nearly every battery had one or two howitzers to complement the cannon.

Combined Arms & Unit Ratios

Infantry was the basic arm on the battlefield, capable of fighting in any terrain, and taking or holding a piece of ground with finality. It was also the most flexible of the arms, both in terms of detaching portions of a battalion and in the various formations it could adopt in the face of particular situations. The flexibility also extended to the physical arrangement of a battalion’s companies: on line to maximize firepower, in open column for rapid movement, close column to deliver assaults, or open order for skirmishing or fighting in rough terrain.

All infantry formations were essentially linear, since its combat power depended on the number of men able to fire or fight. Flanks were necessarily vulnerable, and infantry had to take care lest it be caught in a situation where it could be attacked from the flank more rapidly than it could pivot to face the threat. If the threat could not be avoided, for instance when cavalry was in the vicinity, infantry could form a closed ring, usually referred to as “square” but actually taking almost any shape desired. Like columns, squares could be loose or tight depending on the situation.

Cavalry’s essence was its speed, allowing it to choose the point of contact or escape from a tight situation. Light cavalry could be dispersed much like infantry skirmishers to provide a screen for larger units behind. Most cavalrymen carried pistols and many had carbines, so much of this work was done with firepower, either on horseback or dismounted.

For the most part, though, cavalry relied on the shock power generated by the sheer weight of its mounts, magnified by the ability of units to stay tightly together to maximize impact. Light cavalry, such as Hussars, lancers or Uhlan, Chasseurs, and light dragoons, excelled at rapid maneuver. They were arm of choice for catching infantry on the flank, or pursuing a broken enemy to ensure he could not reform. Heavy cavalry was less maneuverable and flexible, but possessed significantly greater hitting power. They worked best when combined with light cavalry to break up or draw out an enemy to set up a final attack.

Cavalry’s vulnerability was to the firepower of a solid infantry formation—not just in square but in a line or other formation with
protected flanks—and above all to cannon. Unlike infantry, cavalrymen could not lie down to avoid artillery fire, and horses were liable to become unmanageable. Cavalry also took longer than infantry to recover its strength after exertions as horses took longer to recuperate.

Artillery had poor maneuverability when getting into and out of combat because of the time needed to limber and unlimber. Unlimbering took 30 seconds, limbering somewhat longer. Infantry could cover 50 yards in that time, cavalry many times that distance, so a battery’s position had to be chosen in light of the situation. It would deploy not in a straight line but en échelon, allowing at least some ability to fire to one flank, but even more than infantry was restricted to a narrow firing arc to its front.

On the other hand, once placed, artillery could deliver tremendous firepower into that arc, and could reach far beyond the ability of infantry or cavalry to respond offensively. Cannon were most effective against tight formations, since each round, whether solid shot, shell, or canister, would strike multiple individuals.

The differing capabilities of the arms led to the “rock-paper-scissors” feel of Napoleonic tactics on both attack and defense. Artillery would force a battalion to disperse while the threat of cavalry would lead it to concentrate. Skirmishers could approach artillery at close range to pick off gunners, who could not respond effectively against multiple dispersed targets. Cavalry, on the other hand, could make short work of skirmishers but was vulnerable to enemy artillery unless it could be caught from the flank or rear.

Only infantry could fight alone for long, so as a practical matter cavalry and artillery were—to use a modern term—force multipliers rather than truly independent arms. One crucial element of an army’s strength on the battlefield was the relative strength of each arm to the others, both in raw numbers and in maneuver units. The classic standard, reaching back to the era of Frederick the Great, had roughly equal numbers of battalions and squadrons, and three or so of each per battery (displayed here as 3-3-1).

That standard ratio would amount to about 200 cavalry per 1,000 infantrymen, and roughly two cannon per 1,000 infantry and cavalry combined. Napoleon, an artilleryist, thought two cannon per thousand was adequate with good troops, but insufficient as troop quality fell. In practice, the number and weight of cannon had increased over the course of a quarter-century of war.

ARMY OF THE NORTH

The standard assessment of Napoleon’s army at Waterloo (originating with histories by Clausewitz and Thiers, among others) is that it was high-quality but brittle, but this misses the mark on both points.

The French army of 1815 was the product of several different strands. Following humiliating defeats in every quarter during the Seven Years’ War (1756-1763), the army had embarked on a quarter-century of intellectual self-improvement, innovation, and experimentation. New organizations, tactics, and equipment were introduced. The lone stumbling block to its ascension to European preeminence was its command structure. Although men of real talent were plentiful, the army was part and parcel of the decaying Bourbon dynasty. That changed with the revolution that began quietly in 1788 and soon exploded. Among the many victims of the ensuing violence were those at the highest reaches of military command (though it should be noted that most nobles remained loyal to France in lieu of the monarchy, and that many would rise to high rank in Revolutionary and Napoleonic armies).

A second, quieter revolution in 1799 brought a new monarch, Napoleon. Whatever his other vices and virtues, Napoleon was one of the great soldiers in history. Under his leadership, the much-improved army was refined into the most successful military machine of its time, achieving virtual European hegemony by mid-1807.

From there, Napoleon famously overreached himself with wars in Iberia and Russia. His successful army was stretched ever-thinner, padded out with increasingly unwilling conscripts and restive allies, worn out with constant fighting. By 1814, the army was a shadow of its former self.

After Napoleon’s abdication, France and her army began a long, slow resurrection. The army was slashed in size and conscription terminated even as tens of thousands of veterans returned home from Allied prison camps. For the first time in years, the French army had a sufficiency of veterans to fill the ranks, though the first line units included large numbers of recent recruits. With fewer officers needed, the lesser lights could be retired. Unit quality could not help but recover.

This is the underlying argument for the supposedly high-quality of the army at Waterloo. The reality is that the army was deeply mistrusted by the returned Bourbons, who not incorrectly viewed it as Bonapartist and therefore a threat to the throne rather than a support for it. To minimize this threat, units were dissolved, merged, and cut to the bone. Far from receiving preference, Napoleon’s veterans were shunted aside. Units still had cadres of experienced men, and the officer corps was uniformly experienced and talented, but the army was a far cry from the legions Napoleon had led to the banks of the Niemen in 1807.

The army’s brittleness supposedly was traced to the veterans’ mistrust of a high command, the marshalate in particular, that to protect its own positions and wealth had forced Napoleon to abdicate in 1814. As a result, they were primed to panic at the first sign of leadership failure. This thread of thought supposedly was proven when the army suddenly collapsed on the evening of 18 June.

Again, the facts indicate otherwise. Although there were several instances of officers defecting to the Allies to warn of impending attacks—in one case during the battle of the 18th from the Guard no less—there are no instances of mutinies or disobedience. The army fought with enthusiasm throughout the campaign and the battle. The rout at the end of the day was due to the simple fact that the army was nearly surrounded by double its numbers and at the end of its strength after eight hours of fighting. It should be noted that not a single regimental eagle was lost during the retreat, and that nearly every man not felled in battle or captured returned to the ranks when the army regrouped at Laon.

The simple truth is that the French army in 1815 was what it had been for nearly a quarter-century: a highly-professional organization ready, willing, and able to carry out the orders of its commanders. Most of France’s active field forces had been incorporated into the Army of the North, and about two-thirds of that army (after casualties) was present at Waterloo:

50,425 infantry in 104 battalions
15,425 cavalry in 114 squadrons
254 cannon in 35 batteries

Unit Ratio: 3 battalions to 3.3 squadrons to 1 battery
Cavalry Ratio: 306 per 1,000 infantry
Artillery Ratio: 3.9 cannon per 1,000 combatants

The numbers above hew closely to the classic ratio of units, but fall afoot when unit strength is considered: Napoleon’s army was short of infantry.

HIGH COMMAND

Much ink has been spilled discussing Napoleon’s detachment during the day at Waterloo, a result of fatigue or sickness or just being worn out. This almost certainly is overstated. Throughout the day, he clearly had a good grasp of the situation and intervened when necessary. After issuing
orders, he depended on his subordinates to carry them out, leaving him free to consider the larger situation.

This apparent inactivity, especially contrasted with Wellington’s constant movement across the valley, was a product of the command structure of the army. One of Napoleon’s few true innovations was not the invention but the regularization of the corps d’armée. Fifty years earlier, armies were composed of organizations no larger than regiments; deploying for battle required issuing order to each regiment, then assigning lines of regiments to various officers. In the aftermath of the Seven Years’ War, the idea of permanent divisions took hold. A permanent corps of several divisions was the next logical step, especially as armies grew larger.

When Napoleon formed his Grande Armée in the camp at Boulogne (1803-1805), one of his first acts was to divide the army into corps under his marshals. Each corps had two or more infantry divisions, a brigade or more of light cavalry, several batteries of artillery, plus a small logistics train. Each in effect was a miniature army, capable of moving and fighting on its own. This facilitated movement along a wide front to enable more rapid marches and better concealment when converging on a battlefield. The entire army almost never met on a single field. Instead, Napoleon would collect a subset of his corps and add to it his reserve cavalry and artillery, while the remaining corps guarded other sectors or undertook supporting missions. After the battle, the corps would disperse again. The organization was marvelously flexible and allowed a single army to pursue several avenues simultaneously.

The flexibility descended to the makeup of the corps as well. They were not permanent organizations in an administrative sense. Divisions could be shifted from corps to corps, both on and off the battlefield, to create the appropriate mix of units for a given mission.

Such a command organization placed a great deal of authority and responsibility on Napoleon’s subordinates. There were six of these men at Waterloo.

Two were members of the first wave of marshals created in 1804, Nicolas Jean de Dieu Soult and Michel Ney. Soult had been drafted to act as Napoleon’s chief-of-staff to replace the irreplaceable Berthier, who died shortly before the campaign. A first-rate field commander, Soult in effect was outside the chain of command, acting only as a coordinator and collector of messages to and from Napoleon. His performance left something to be desired, but at least part of that was due to incomplete or conflicting instructions from his master.

Ney, the great enigma of the campaign, was a last-minute addition to the army. His conduct as a wing commander in the first few days of the campaign remains the subject of fierce debate. At Waterloo, he acted as field commander, taking charge of each major effort against Wellington but not managing the battle as a whole. Whether this was by Napoleon’s design or Ney’s supposed derangement is also open to question.

Next came Antoine Drouot, commanding the Guard. Like Soult he was a substitute, replacing Marshal Mortier, too gout-ridden to take the field. An artilleryman by trade, Drouot was utterly out of place commanding a mixed-arms corps; it was a misuse of his talents and he made no appreciable contribution to the battle.

The remaining three men commanded the corps d’armée on the field: Drouet D’Erlon of First Corps, Honoré Reille of Second Corps, and Georges Mouton (better known by his title, Comte de Lobau) of Sixth Corps. All were accomplished veterans of long standing and more than capable of handling their commands. During the day, each received at least some reinforcement from outside his original command. D’Erlon and Reille both made significant errors during the day but each kept his command in action throughout and cannot be faulted for energy or willingness. Lobau turned in one of the best performances on the field, fending off greatly superior Prussian forces long enough to give Napoleon a chance to beat Wellington.

INFANTRY OF THE LINE

The heart of the French army, and of every other army of the period, was its infantry regiments. Each had a home depot in one of France’s geographic districts. A regiment nominally had four battalions, three field and one depot, designated with an Arabic numeral followed by the regimental designation (for example, 1/54 = 1st Battalion, 54th Infantry).

About a fifth of French regiments were denominated Ligne (Light), the remainder being Ligne (Line, or ordinary troops). In theory, the distinction between types was based on light regiments having more training in the open order fighting that was becoming the infantry standard (though it would not supplant linear fighting entirely until the advent of breechloading weapons). In reality, there was little to choose between light and line units, light regiments having a bit more elan in the attack.

A regiment’s field battalions had six companies of 140 men each, four of the center, one of grenadiers, and one of light troops. Even light battalions, supposedly all “light,” had two specially-named companies, though the terminology was different than in line units. The reality again suggests at most a marginal difference between companies.

The depot battalion had only four (center) companies. Manning the home station, it was charged with receiving recruits and preparing them to join the regiment in the field. These would be sent in a bataillon de marche, an ad hoc organization that might include men for several regiments.

When Napoleon returned to France in March 1815, the infantry regiments were badly under strength, averaging just two field battalions of about 500 men each. Politically unable to reintroduce conscription, he confined himself to a recall of furloughed veterans and those men conscripted in previous years who had not yet reported. This measure would have doubled the size of the regiments, but not until mid-summer, a month after Waterloo. The Army of the North therefore went to war with thin infantry regiments, averaging barely 40 percent of their nominal strength.

Regiments, usually four, were grouped into divisions, then paired into brigades. An infantry division thus presented what later would be known as a “square” structure, with two brigades of two regiments of two or three battalions. However, this appears to have been primarily a paper exercise. In almost all cases, the regiments of a division are listed in terms of seniority, light regiments before line, and each in numerical sequence. The first brigade generally gets the first two listed, the second the last two (exceptions are noted below).

In the field, divisions demonstrated considerable flexibility, grouping battalions as needed to form “columns,” the word used here to refer to a collection of battalions acting as a single body against a single point. In this schema, the brigade and regimental commanders acted more as assistant division commanders than as links in a hierarchical chain. Some histories of this and other campaigns actually do acknowledge this, with orders of battle showing each division shown as a list of regiments with divisional and brigade commanders as a group; this presentation is used below.

INFANTRY OF THE OLD GUARD

Throughout the eighteenth century, commanders in the field, in some cases pursuant to official doctrine, had collected grenadier companies from line units to form elite battalions. Napoleon himself had done this during the 1805-1806 campaigns. (The practice continues to this day, with elite units like US Army Rangers culling the best material from line units.) At its worst, the practice results in a dull edge among the demuded line units (one German commander in WWII referred to line infantry as “dross”) since each ranker in an elite unit is a potential leader in a more average unit. At its best, an army gains an absolutely dependable unit for use at critical points.
Napoleon’s Guard is a case in point on both sides of the argument. Only long service veterans were eligible to join; for the senior battalions, 20 years’ service was mandatory. The sum of experience in the Guard ranks—a quarter of the French infantry at Waterloo, about a sixth of the whole Army of the North—certainly would have improved the performance of the line infantry if spread among them. On the other hand, at the end of the battle, a line of four Guard battalions slowed the Allied advance, while the last three battalions—just 1,600 men—held back the pursuing Allies long enough for most of the French army to escape.

The infantry of the Old Guard was in even worse shape than the line infantry on Napoleon’s return. It had been reduced to four weak battalions by the suspicious Bourbons. Napoleon brought what amounted to two more with him from Elba. Enough veterans were collected—though with reduced standards—to rebuild two more. As had been the case throughout the Guard’s history, these were divided into two branches, grenadiers and chasseurs, equating roughly to the grenadier and light companies of the line. The eight battalions were enough to fill out the four senior regiments—1st and 2nd Grenadiers and 1st and 2nd Chasseurs—with two battalions each.

Four additional regiments (3rd and 4th Grenadiers, 3rd and 4th Chasseurs) were created from scratch by lowering the standard still further. The organization of the new regiments was completed (though the 4th Grenadiers had only one battalion) barely a month before the campaign opened. Unusually for the immaculate Guard, these regiments had inconsistent uniforms. The drop in quality of the new units was recognized by the entire army, especially by the “real” Old Guard, so these regiments were unofficially referred to as the “Middle Guard.” The term had been used a few years earlier for a different class of Guard regiments; its resurrection for this campaign was emphatically not a compliment. Whatever the opinion of others, the regiments were composed of veterans and performed well in combat, buckling only under extreme pressure by superior numbers.

The Old Guard used a different organization than line infantry. Administratively it was divided into a division each of grenadiers and chasseurs. There also was an unofficial separation into the senior (Old) and junior (Middle) divisions. In reality, there were no division commanders. Each brigade—a pair of regiments like the line—had its own battery and in effect was a small division. In the field, even this organization was not used entirely, as battalions could be sent off alone (for example, the 1/1 Chasseurs guarded the army’s treasury wagons at Le Caillou during the battle) or in non-brigaded pairs (the 1/2 Grenadiers and 1/2 Chasseurs were sent to attack the Prussians at Plancenoit).

Nore were the leaders parochial; Friant, commanding both the grenadier division and the first grenadier brigade, accompanied the 1/3 Grenadiers in the final attack. Roguet took command of the battalions sent to Plancenoit, though neither came from his brigade.

INFANTRY OF THE YOUNG GUARD

Although connected to the Old Guard, the Young Guard was a separate organization. Its purpose was never clearly stated; it may have been an officer incubator for line regiments, or a way to take advantage of what little enthusiasm there was among conscripts, or simply an attempt to support the “elderly” guardsmen with some young blood.

Unlike the Old Guard, its personnel were not called from the line regiments, but were drawn from the most promising material of each annual class of recruits. Its regiments, called Tireailleurs and Voltiguaux, were associated respectively with the Grenadier and Chasseur branches of the Old Guard, whence they drew their cadres.

The Young Guard had been disbanded during the peace. Napoleon strove mightily to rebuild it into a corps of three divisions. Only three of its six brigades were fit for field duty by mid-June, and one of them was sent to the Vendee, leaving just a pair for the Army of the North.

CAVALRY

French cavalry regiments were intended to have four field and one depot squadrons, each of 150 men. Many regiments could only manage three squadrons for the campaign, and many of these were sufficiently under strength to require amalgamation in the field. The cavalry of the Guard generally had more and larger squadrons, its regiments being roughly double the size of even the larger line units. As elsewhere, cavalry was divided into heavy and light.

France’s heavy cavalry had been left almost untouched during the restoration, due both to the prestige of the units (heavy cavalry, descendant from the knights of old, long had been the special province of the nobility) and the difficulty of raising them quickly in time of war. There were twelve regiments of steel-coated cuirassiers, two of carabiniers (generally comparable to cuirassiers), and one of Grenadier Chevaux à Cheval. As a rule, these regiments were collected exclusively in the cavalry reserve to enable a single massive blow; every regiment was present at Waterloo.

The light cavalry, almost halved during the restoration, consisted of fifteen regiments of line Chasseurs à Cheval, one of Guard Chasseurs à Cheval, and seven of Hussars. These regiments were scattered throughout the army, forming the light divisions assigned to infantry corps, part of the cavalry reserve, and as independent units around the French frontier.

Somewhere in between the light and heavy regiments came fifteen regiments of dragoons and six of lancers, plus one of each type in the Guard. The dragoons had long been the odd man out in Napoleon’s cavalry, being too heavy for light work and too light for heavy work. In the Army of the North, they formed five brigades (including one whole cavalry corps) used as light cavalry, and one brigade used as heavy cavalry. The dragoons of the Guard were unquestionably heavy.

The lancers, all but the Guard converted from dragoon regiments several years earlier, were treated as light cavalry in organizational terms, being paired generally with chasseurs. Their lances, however, gave them a shock power nearly equivalent to heavy cavalry. (This is the likely reason Napoleon detached 5th Cavalry Division from its parent corps, to ensure he had its lancers on the decisive battlefield.)

Like the infantry, cavalry divisions generally were formed of four regiments, though two had only three regiments, and the Guard divisions just two oversized units, again paired into brigades. Unlike the infantry, the brigades did fight as cohesive units, though the squadrons of the component regiments could be mixed together if needed.

The two cavalry corps commanders, François Kellermann and Edouard Milhaud, were heavy cavalry specialists, their activities limited to ensuring maximum cohesion of their commands at the moment of impact. That specialization, and the small size of their commands, makes them in most respects more equivalent to infantry division commanders than to their fellow corps commanders.

ARTILLERY

France’s artillery was organized in eight regiments of foot artillery, six of horse artillery, and the artillery of the Guard. The number of companies per regiment varied widely, and several regiments may not have had any in 1815. Although companies might serve in the same larger organization, they generally were independent of one another. All were of uniformly excellent quality.

Foot artillery batteries were either light (6-pounders) or heavy (12-pounders). Horse batteries had 6-pounders, and were smaller than foot batteries, with three sections instead of four. The only official difference in the units was that every man in the horse batteries was mounted, while in the foot batteries most of the gunners walked. In the field, the horse batteries had a dash their foot-borne comrades lacked.

Napoleon wanted every infantry division to have a light foot battery and a horse battery, with every cavalry division having a horse battery.
Each corps was to have two or more heavy batteries and possibly an extra horse battery. The required number of cannon could not be made ready before the campaign, so each division went to war with a single battery—foot for infantry, horse for cavalry—while corps reserves were limited to a single heavy foot battery. The Guard complement was roughly double that of the line corps.

In quality of organization as of units, artillery probably was the strong suit of the army as a whole. Each corps had an artillery chief capable of grouping batteries for concentrated fire. The commander of the Guard artillery could do the same for the whole army, commonly taking control of all the heavy foot batteries to form a single grand battery. In general, artillery organization was flexible, capable of detaching and attaching batteries whenever needed. At Waterloo this flexibility went awry; the horse batteries of the heavy cavalry corps were stripped to support the fighting at Hougoumont and Papelotte, leaving none available to support the massive cavalry charges in the late afternoon.

UNITS OF THE ARMY OF THE NORTH

IMPERIAL GUARD

Old Guard (8,400 infantry in 14 battalions, 32 cannon in 4 batteries)

1st Brigade of Grenadiers (Friant)
   1st Grenadiers (2/1,275)
   2nd Grenadiers (2/1,100)
   5th Guard Foot Battery (8x 6-pdr)

2nd Brigade of Grenadiers (Roguet)
   3rd Grenadiers (2/1,150)
   4th Grenadiers (1/500)
   Auxiliary Foot Battery (8x 6-pdr)

1st Brigade of Chasseurs (Morand)
   1st Chasseurs (3/1,300)
   2nd Chasseurs (2/1,175)
   6th Guard Foot Battery (8x 6-pdr)

2nd Brigade of Chasseurs (Michel)
   3rd Chasseurs (2/1,050)
   4th Chasseurs (850)
   Auxiliary Foot Battery (8x 6-pdr)

The battalions of the 4th Chasseurs were amalgamated after the loss of 300 men at Ligny on the 16th. The reason is obscure, since battalions of 425 men were not unusual in the army at that time. It may have been occasioned by the loss of key leaders, or may simply be a case of maintaining the dignity of the Guard in not having a too-small battalion. The Auxiliary batteries were formed for the campaign, and were manned by naval artillermen of 2nd Battalion, 1st Cannoniers de la Marine.

Young Guard (Duhesne & Barrois; 4,200 men in 8 battalions, 16 cannon in 2 batteries)

Duhesne was commander of the entire Young Guard, Barrois of the lone division present.

1st Young Guard Brigade (Chartrand)
   1st Tirailleurs (2/1,100)
   1st Voltigeurs (2/1,175)
   Auxiliary Foot Battery (8x 6-pdr)

3rd Young Guard Brigade (Guys)
   3rd Tirailleurs (2/975)
   3rd Voltigeurs (2/950)
   Auxiliary Foot Battery (8x 6-pdr)

Several sources identify the Young Guard artillery as the 12th and 13th Companies of the 7th Artillery Regiment, others state there was only a single battery of “Young Guard” artillery. I think the provision of two batteries more likely, and many sources indicate there were four auxiliary foot batteries.

Light Cavalry Division (Lefebvre-Desnoëttes; 2,075 cavalry in 10 squadrons, 12 cannon in 2 batteries)

1st Brigade (Lallemand)
   Chasseurs à Cheval (5/1,200)
   1st Guard Horse Battery (6x 6-pdr)

One of the units missing from the battle was the company of Mamelukes, a unit of scouts and guides formed by Napoleon after his Egyptian campaign of 1798-1800. There were some present, but it seems clear they fought as individuals in the ranks of the Chasseurs.

2nd Brigade (Colbert-Chabanais)
   1st “Polish” Lancers (1; 175)
   2nd “Dutch” or “Red” Lancers (4/700)
   2nd Guard Horse Battery (6x 6-pdr)

Although officially a separate regiment, the single Polish squadron appears to have operated as though it was part of the 2nd.

Heavy Cavalry Division (Guyot; 1,575 cavalry in 8 squadrons, 12 cannon in 2 batteries)

The nominal number of squadrons in all the Guard cavalry regiments is indefinite. Because of the size of the regiments, each formed a brigade by itself (except the Lancers), the regimental commander also commanding the brigade.

1st Brigade (Jamin)
   Grenadiers à Cheval (4/775)
   3rd Guard Horse Battery (6x 6-pdr)

2nd Brigade (Hoffmayer)
   Empress Dragoons (4/800)
   4th Guard Horse Battery (6x 6-pdr)

Reserve Artillery (St. Maurice; 32 cannon in 4 batteries)

1st Guard Foot Battery (8x 12-pdr)
   2nd Guard Foot Battery (8x 12-pdr)
   3rd Guard Foot Battery (8x 12-pdr)
   4th Guard Foot Battery (8x 12-pdr)
   Sappers-Miners (125)
   Marines (150)
   Gendarmes d’Élite (100)

The Gendarmes were the army’s police, but they also were superb heavy cavalry and generally attached themselves to the Guard Heavy Cavalry during battle.
**D'ERLON'S FIRST CORPS**

1st Infantry Division (Quiot with Charlet & Bourgeois; 4,000 infantry in 8 battalions, 8 cannon in 1 battery)
- 28th Line (2/900)
- 54th Line (2/975)
- 55th Line (2/1,150)
- 105th Line (2/975)
- 20/6th Foot Artillery (8x 6-pdr)

2nd Infantry Division (Donzelot with Schmitz & Aulard; 5,125 infantry in 9 battalions, 8 cannon in 1 battery)
- 13th Light (3/1,875)
- 17th Line (2/1,050)
- 19th Line (2/1,025)
- 51st Line (2/1,175)
- 10/6th Foot Artillery (8x 6-pdr)

3rd Infantry Division: (Marcognet with Noguez & Grenier; 4,025 infantry in 8 battalions, 8 cannon in 1 battery)
- 21st Line (2/1,150)
- 25th Line (2/975)
- 45th Line (2/1,000)
- 46th Line (2/900)
- 19/6th Foot Artillery (8x 6-pdr)

**REILLE'S SECOND CORPS**

5th Infantry Division (Bachelu with Husson & Campi; 3,225 infantry in 9 battalions, 8 cannon in 1 battery)
- 3rd Line (2/900)
- 61st Line (2/650)
- 72nd Line (2/775)
- 108th Line (3/900)
- 18/6th Foot Artillery (8x 6-pdr)

This division was heavily engaged in the open field throughout the day at Quatre-Bras and suffered accordingly.

6th Infantry Division (Bonaparte with Baudin & Soye; 6,250 infantry in 13 battalions, 8 cannon in 1 battery)
- 1st Light (3/1,500)
- 2nd Light (4: 1,900)
- 1st Line (3/1,450)
- 2nd Line (3/1,400)
- 2/2nd Foot Artillery (8x 6-pdr)

There is uncertainty regarding the assignment of the 2nd Light. It had been part of 5th Division prior to the campaign before being swapped to 6th Division for the 3rd Line. It definitely fought with the 5th at Quatre-Bras and probably the day after at Genappe, but equally probably though not certainly with the 6th at Waterloo.

9th Infantry Division (Foy with Tissot & Jamin; 4,400 infantry in 11 battalions, 8 cannon in 1 battery)
- 4th Light (3/1,325)
- 92nd Line (2/875)
- 93rd Line (3/1,225)
- 100th Line (3/975)
- 1/6th Foot Artillery (8x 6-pdr)

The 4th Light and 100th nominally formed the 2nd Brigade. No regimental strength in the battle is less certain than that of the 93rd, which ranges in disparate sources from 2 battalions with 975 men to 3 with 1,500, and several points between. The higher strength comports better with the total numbers usually given for Second Corps.

2nd Cavalry Division (Piré; 1,850 cavalry in 15 squadrons, 6 cannon in 1 battery)

Brigade Hubert (1st)
- 1st Chasseurs (4/500)
- 6th Chasseurs (4/575)

Brigade Wathiez (2nd)
- 5th Lancers (3/375)
- 6th Lancers (4/400)

Artillery
- 2/4th Horse Artillery (6x 6-pdr)

**Reserve Artillery (Desales)**
- 11/6th Foot Artillery (8x 12-pdr)
- 2/1st Engineers (350)
LOBAU’S SIXTH CORPS

19th Infantry Division (Simmer with Bellair & Thevenet; 3,925 infantry in 9 battalions, 8 cannon in 1 battery)
- 5th Line (2/950)
- 11th Line (3/1,200)
- 27th Line (2/825)
- 84th Line (2/950)
- 1/8th Foot Artillery (8x 6-pdr)

20th Infantry Division (Jeanin with Bony & Tromelin; 3,025 infantry in 7 battalions, 8 cannon in 1 battery)
- 5th Light (2/875)
- 10th Line (3/1,425)
- 107th Line (2/725)
- 2/8th Foot Artillery (8x 6-pdr)

Reserve Artillery (Noury)
- 4/8th Foot Artillery (8x 12-pdr)
- Guard Auxiliary Horse Battery (6x 6-pdr)
- 2/3rd Engineers (200)

KELLERMANN’S THIRD CAVALRY CORPS

11th Cavalry Division (l’Heritier; 1,725 cavalry in 13 squadrons, 6 cannon in 1 battery)
- Brigade Picquet (1st)
  - 2nd Dragoons (4/575)
  - 7th Dragoons (4/525)
- Brigade Guiton (2nd)
  - 8th Cuirassiers (3/350)
  - 11th Cuirassiers (2/275)

Artillery
- 3/2nd Horse Artillery (6x 6-pdr)

12th Cavalry Division (d’Urbal; 1,650 cavalry in 12 squadrons, 6 cannon in 1 battery)
- Brigade Blanchard (1st)
  - 1st Carabiniers (3/425)
  - 2nd Carabiniers (3/425)
- Brigade Donop (2nd)
  - 2nd Cuirassiers (2/325)
  - 3rd Cuirassiers (4/475)

Artillery
- 2/2nd Horse Artillery (6x 6-pdr)

MILHAUD’S FOURTH CAVALRY CORPS

13th Cavalry Division (Saint-Alphonse; 1,125 cavalry in 11 squadrons, 6 cannon in 1 battery)
- Brigade Dubois (1st)
  - 1st Cuirassiers (4/450)
  - 4th Cuirassiers (3/300)
- Brigade Travers (2nd)
  - 7th Cuirassiers (2/150)
  - 12th Cuirassiers (2/225)

Artillery
- 5/1st Horse Artillery (6x 6-pdr)

14th Cavalry Division (Delort; 1,625 cavalry in 13 squadrons, 6 cannon in 1 battery)
- Brigade du Creux (1st)
  - 5th Cuirassiers (3/525)
  - 10th Cuirassiers (3/325)
- Brigade Vial (2nd)
  - 6th Cuirassiers (3/400)
  - 9th Cuirassiers (4/375)

Artillery
- 4/3rd Horse Artillery (6x 6-pdr)
**ARMY OF THE LOW COUNTRIES**

Arthur Wellesley, Duke of Wellington, commanded a total of between 105,000 and 107,000 men. Of these perhaps 5,000 had become casualties by the morning of 18 June. Thousands more, almost all second-class militia, were spread around Belgium in garrisons. One major detachment, 15,000 to 17,000 strong, was stationed west of the battlefield at Hal, for which Wellington has been criticized. At Mont Saint Jean on the 18th, Wellington deployed a total of about 70,000 men:

- 49,825 infantry in 84½ battalions
- 13,650 cavalry in 96 squadrons
- 157 cannon in 25 batteries

Unit Ratio: 3.4 battalions to 3.8 squadrons to 1 battery  
Cavalry Ratio: 274 per 1,000 infantry  
Artillery Ratio: 2.5 cannon per 1,000 combatants

As can be seen, Wellington's army was reasonably well balanced, though of course the numbers do not take qualitative issues into account.

**HIGH COMMAND**

The army nominally was formed in two corps and a reserve, each built around a pair of British-Hanoverian divisions. As a practical matter Wellington ignored his corps commanders, and on occasion even his division and brigade commanders. This was partly a question of his command style, and partly a reflection of the politically-mandated command structure.

In particular, the commander of his oversized First Corps, the 21-year-old Prince William of Orange, was as much a liability as an asset. While not incompetent or inexperienced as often presented, he certainly was not ready to direct four divisions in a major battle. His command was spread literally across the entire British front, relegating the prince to little more than a cheerleader for Netherlands and Nassau troops in the center.

Wellington’s other corps commander, Rowland Hill, was an experienced commander known to, and trusted by, Wellington. Much of Hill’s corps was at Hal, leaving him what amounted to a single reinforced division. He was under-utilized in the battle, spending most of the day west of Hougoumont, though he did lead one of his brigades in a charge at the end of the battle.

The final member of Wellington’s command team was Henry Paget, Earl of Uxbridge. Second-in-command of the entire army, Uxbridge was given command of all the cavalry, even the quasi-independent Netherlands division, Hanoverian brigade, and Brunswick brigade. The cavalry command is treated in some sources as a division, in others as a corps, and there is equal confusion whether it was part of the reserve or independent of (which is a motto point, as Wellington commanded the reserve). This centralized cavalry command, reminiscent of Napoleon’s cavalry reserve, was nominal rather than actual. The cavalry also was spread across the entire front, and Uxbridge effectively released his brigade commanders to act on their own initiative. Surprisingly, it worked well.

Wellington’s army generally is described as a polyglot, multi-national force. In truth, there were between four and six different contingents making up the army, depending on how one counts them, speaking four languages: English, German, Dutch, and French. However, the army’s demonstrated incapacity for articulated maneuver had more to do with the over-centralization of command in the person of Wellington than with coordination between its disparate elements. Most of the senior commanders were multi-lingual, so with rare exceptions there were no serious breakdowns caused by language difficulties.

**BRITISH**

The 32,000-man British contingent was not surprisingly the largest single group in the army. Most were present at Mont Saint Jean:

- 15,325 infantry in 25½ battalions  
- 6,550 cavalry in 49 squadrons  
- 77 cannon in 13 batteries

This was not the razor-sharp army Wellington had commanded in Spain. In traditional British fashion, the military had been cut heavily with the advent of peace in 1814. What veterans there were had been scattered, with a large number being sent to America to fight the ongoing War of 1812.

That said, eleven battalions, including the diminutive 3/95, included here as a half-battalion, had been with him at his great victory of Vitoria in 1813 (for which Beethoven wrote Wellington’s Victory). This number included all the battalions of the 3rd Brigade, probably the best single unit in the Allied army. Of the remainder, four were oversized Guards battalions with excellent material and officers, and four more were “first” battalions (see below). The rest had at least some experience except 3/14, probably the only questionable battalion in the contingent.

British infantry had an enviable reputation for steadiness and firepower, the result of actual target practice during training. The army was at the forefront of the gradual evolution of all infantry into light infantry, capable of fighting in open order. The light battalions, called variously Light or Fusiliers, were excellent, the rifle battalions superb. Each ten-company battalion had one company of grenadiers and one of light infantry, but all companies were trained to skirmish, though the center companies probably were not as effective as French line units.

Each regiment consisted of a home station and one or more battalions (identified with an Arabic numeral). Unlike every other army, the battalions rarely served together and were treated individually when they did. Some regiments, (like the 33rd) had only a single battalion. As a result, the terms ‘regiment’ and ‘battalion’ are often—properly—used interchangeably when discussing British infantry. The first battalion of each regiment was usually the oldest and most experienced, but in the aftermath of the long war even the newest second battalion had some experienced men.

The only weakness of the British infantry—other than a penchant for indiscipline away from the battlefield—was a limited tactical repertoire. Battalions were designed and trained to fight individually in line, and they did so better than battalions in any other army. However, they were less adept at the more complicated mixed-order fighting that characterized the Continental armies.

The cavalry (more than half of which had been at Vitoria) was every bit as effective as the infantry at the point of contact. This was due in large part to its being wonderfully mounted; British cavalry eschewed the docile geldings preferred by most armies in favor of stronger but less-controllable mares. As a result, even nominally “light” cavalry packed a tremendous wallop in a charge.

The undoing of the cavalry was indiscipline in the field, this only partly due to its mounts. Squadrons and even individuals spurred ahead, with little regard for flanks or maneuver. This served it well in special circumstances, such as the charge of the heavies in the early afternoon at Waterloo, but more often led to a too-rapid dissipation of fighting strength.

British artillery was uniformly excellent in men, horses, equipment, and ammunition. The standard 9-pounder field gun was considerably more powerful than the 6-pounders used by all the other armies on the field. Only the 9-pounder had the heft to utilize Henry Shrapnel’s new shell, which if properly—and given the technology of the time that was a big “if”—fuzed gave long-range fire the killing effect of canister.
The shortcoming of the artillery was in command. Although each division had a pair of batteries, and the army a large reserve, batteries fought individually. There was little structure and no experience in forming the massed batteries that characterized Napoleon’s fighting style. At Waterloo this weakness was covered up by the compressed size of the field and the fact that the army fought defensively all day.

**HANOVERIANS**

The kingdom of Hanover shared a monarch with Great Britain (and would until the accession of Victoria in 1837). As a result, the Hanoverian army had been considered part of the British army during the preceding century. That changed in 1803 when the country was overrun by the French and made part of the Kingdom of Westphalia.

Soldiers who escaped to England shortly thereafter formed the King’s German Legion. Limited initially to Hanoverian exiles, as a matter of necessity the Legion soon came to be almost the British foreign legion. By 1815 there were ten battalions, twenty squadrons, and three batteries. The units of all arms were uniformly excellent: the infantry and artillery comparable to the best British units, the cavalry with the power of British cavalry tied to Continental discipline.

The process of incorporation of these units into Hanoverian service already was underway. The KGL had provided cadres for many new Hanoverian formations and was having difficulty obtaining recruits, accounting for the shrunken size of the units. All but two battalions were in Belgium, and most units were present at the battle:

- 3,650 infantry in 8 battalions
- 2,375 cavalry in 16 squadrons
- 12 cannon in 2 batteries

The other portion of the Hanoverian contribution was the army formed in the country after it was freed from French rule in 1813. By 1814, the army officially was detached from the British army, though many details of organization, drill, and uniform remained common.

The new army was weak in both cavalry and artillery. The lone cavalry regiment present at the battle turned in a notoriously poor performance, including (apparently) a mass exodus after little fighting. The artillery, receiving its 9-pounders from British stores just weeks prior to the battle, performed creditably.

The bulk of the army was infantry, formed of battalions raised individually and named for their home districts. There were two classes of battalions: field (regular) and Landwehr (reserve). During the spring of 1815, the battalions nominally were grouped into regiments of one field and three Landwehr battalions from the same district. This arrangement was ignored by Wellington, but the regimental association is indicated in the list below using—in the German fashion—a Roman numeral for the battalion and an Arabic numeral for the regiment, the 1st battalion of each regiment being its field battalion. Almost the entire army was in Belgium, 36 of 38½ extant battalions, all three cavalry regiments, and two batteries. Many units were posted in garrisons, so the units present at the battle were limited to:

- 10,250 infantry in 17½ battalions
- 500 cavalry in 4 squadrons
- 18 cannon in 3 batteries

**NASSAUERS**

The Nassauers were to the Dutch as the Hanoverians were to the British: kinsmen by virtue of monarchical ties, though in this case it was related monarchs from the same family, the House of Orange, rather than the same person. Unlike all the other armies present, the three Nassau regiments were independent of one another and did not represent a truly national force. Together, the regiments amount to:

- 6,600 infantry in 8½ battalions

The 2nd Nassau was the oldest and most experienced formation, having fought for the French in the Peninsula before joining the Allies in 1813. Its I Battalion appears to have been treated as a light battalion by virtue of its greater experience, though it was not so named.

The Orange-Nassau Regiment (so-called because it was raised in Nassau but taken into the Netherlands pay) had been raised in 1814, in time to take part in the last campaign before the peace. Although two-battalions strong, it officially was numbered 28 on the Netherlands army list.

The 1st Nassau was entirely new, having been recently raised to replace a unit disbanded to escape service under the Prussians. Composed of just two battalions, it was joined for the campaign by a battalion of Nassau Landwehr.

**BRUNSWICKERS**

The Duchy of Brunswick, a long-time Prussian ally, fell under French control after the Prussian debacle of 1806. It too was made part of the French-ruled Kingdom of Westphalia. The exiled Duke returned to raise a brigade (known as the Black Corps or the Black Brunswickers) to fight alongside the Austrians in 1809. After another defeat, the Duke took his men to England, thence to Spain, where they served under Wellington. During the peace, the Duke expanded his command to divisional size (but retaining the name “corps”). Although a kernel of experienced men remained, the bulk of the corps was inexperienced and astonishingly
young. It suffered substantial casualties—among them the much-loved Duke—two days before the battle at Quatre-Bras. Its strength on the field was:

- 4,875 infantry in 8 battalions
- 925 cavalry in 4 squadrons
- 16 cannon in 2 batteries

**UNITS OF THE ARMY OF THE LOW COUNTRIES**
*All units are British unless specified otherwise.*

**FIRST CORPS**

1st (Guards) Division (Cooke; 3,525 infantry in 4 battalions, 12 cannon in 2 batteries)

1st (Guards) Brigade (Maitland; 2/1,475)
- 2/1st Guards (725)
- 3/1st Guards (750)

This brigade, unusual in having two battalions from the same regiment, lost a quarter of its strength at Quatre-Bras. The appellation Grenadier and the bearskin headgear would be added after Waterloo in the mistaken belief it had driven back the Napoleon’s Grenadiers; its opponents in fact were Chasseurs.

2nd (Guards) Brigade (Byng; 2/2,050)
- 2/2nd “Coldstream” Guards (1,000)
- 3/2nd “Scots” Guards (1,050)

Artillery (Adye; 2/12)
- Sandham’s Foot Battery (6 x 9-pdr)
- Kuhlmann’s 2nd KGL Horse Battery (6 x 9-pdr)

3rd Division (Alten; 6,650 infantry in 13½ battalions, 12 cannon in 2 batteries)

5th Brigade (C.Halkett; 4/1,950)
- 2/30th (550)
- 33rd (500)
- 2/69th (400)
- 2/73rd (500)

2nd KGL Brigade (Ompteda; 4/1,675)
- 1st KGL Light (450)
- 2nd KGL Light (400)
- 5th KGL Line (425)
- 8th KGL Line (400)

1st Hanoverian Brigade (Kielmansegge; 5½/3,025)
- I/1 Bremen (475)
- I/2 Verden (500)
- I/4 Duke of York (575)
- I/5 Lüneberg Light (575)
- I/9 Grubenhagen Light (600)
- I/10 Feldjäger Corps (½; 300)

Artillery (Williamson)
- Lloyd’s Foot Battery (6 x 9-pdr)
- Cleeves’ Hanoverian Foot Battery (6 x 9-pdr)

Cleeves’ battery may still have been part of the KGL, but most sources place it in the Hanoverian army.

2nd Netherlands Division (Perponcher; 6,425 infantry in 10½ battalions, 10 cannon in 2 batteries)

1st Brigade (Bylandt; 5/2,600)
- 7th (Belgian) Line Bn (625)
- 27th (Dutch) Jager Bn (700)
- 5th (Dutch) Militia Bn (175)
- 7th (Dutch) Militia Bn (600)
- 8th (Dutch) Militia Bn (500)

The 5th Militia had suffered heavily in its defense of the Gemioncourt Farm at Quatre Bras.

2nd Brigade (Prince Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar; 5½/3,825)
- 2nd Nassau Regiment (3/2,200)
- Nassau-Orange Regiment (2/1,475)
- Nassau Volunteer Jäger Company (150)

Artillery (van Opstal)
- Byleveld’s (Dutch) Horse Battery (8 x 6-pdr)
- Siedevaar’s (Belgian) Foot Battery (2 x 6-pdr)

Siedevaar’s battery had suffered heavily at Quatre-Bras and fielded a single section at Waterloo.

3rd Netherlands Division (Chassé; 6,525 infantry in 12 battalions, 16 cannon in 2 batteries)

1st Brigade (Detmers; 6/3,125)
- 2nd (Dutch) Line Bn (475)
- 35th (Belgian) Chasseur Bn (600)
- 4th (Dutch) Militia Bn (550)
- 6th (Dutch) Militia Bn (500)
- 17th (Dutch) Militia Bn (525)
- 19th (Dutch) Militia Bn (475)

Belgian Chasseurs were equivalent to Dutch Jagers.

2nd Brigade (d’Aubreme; 6/3,400)
- 3rd (Belgian) Line Bn (625)
- 12th (Dutch) Line Bn (425)
- 13th (Dutch) Line Bn (675)
- 36th (Belgian) Chasseur Bn (625)
- 3rd (Dutch) Militia Bn (475)
- 10th (Dutch) Militia Bn (575)

Artillery (van der Smissen)
- Krahmer’s (Belgian) Horse Battery (8 x 6-pdr)
- Lux’s (Belgian) Foot Battery (8 x 6-pdr)

SECOND CORPS

2nd Division (Clinton; 7,200 infantry in 11½ battalions, 12 cannon in 2 batteries)

3rd (Light) Brigade (Adam; 3½/2,775)
- 1/52nd Light (1,125)
- 1/71st “Highland” Light (800)
2/95th Rifles (650)
3/95th Rifles (½/200)

The 3/95th was a provisional unit with just two companies. It spent the battle deployed as skirmishers, while the 2/95th spent the day as a formed battalion.

1st KGL Brigade (du Plat; 4/1,975)
1st KGL Line (450)
2nd KGL Line (500)
3rd KGL Line (525)
4th KGL Line (500)

2nd KGL Line (500)
3rd KGL Line (525)
4th KGL Line (500)

3rd Hanoverian Brigade (H.Halkett; 4/2,450)
IV/1 Bremervörde (625)
II/4 Osnabrück (600)
III/4 Quackenbrück (600)
III/9 Salzgitter (625)

Artillery (Gold)
Bolton’s Foot Battery (6x 9-pdr)
Sympher’s 1st KGL Horse Battery (6x 9-pdr)

4th Division (part; the remainder was at Hal)

4th Brigade (Mitchell; 3/1,925)
3/14th (625)
1/23rd Fusiliers (700)
51st Light (600)

Rettberg’s Hanoverian Foot Battery (6x 9-pdr)

Rettberg’s battery belonged to 4th Division, but deployed with Best’s Brigade at the opposite end of the line.

RESERVE

5th Division (Picton; 5,700 infantry in 12 battalions, 12 cannon in 2 batteries)

8th Brigade (Kempt; 4/1,850)
1/28th (400)
1/32nd (500)
1/79th “Cameron Highlanders” (500)
1/95th Rifles (450)

9th Brigade (Pack; 4/1,350)
3/1st “Royal Scots” (375)
1/42nd “Black Watch” (325)
2/44th (275)
1/92nd “Gordon Highlanders” (375)

5th Hanoverian Brigade (Vincke; 4/2,500)
IV/5 Gifhorn (600)
III/7 Hameln (675)
II/8 Hildesheim (625)
IV/8 Peine (600)

Artillery (Heisse)
Roger’s Foot Battery (6x 9-pdr)
Braun’s Hanoverian Foot Battery (6x 9-pdr)

For all practical purposes, Picton was treated as almost a corps commander by Wellington, having charge of the right wing of the army, including one brigade of 6th Division and one of the 2nd Netherlands Division.

6th Division (7,000 infantry in 10 battalions, 6 cannon in 1 battery)

10th Brigade (Lambert; 3/1,950)
1/4th (575)
1/27th (575)
1/40th (800)

4th Hanoverian Brigade (Best; 4/2,275)
II/2 Verden (475)
II/5 Lüneberg (575)
II/10 Osterode (625)
III/10 Münden (600)

Nassau Brigade (Kruse; 3/2,775)
1st Nassau Regiment (3/2,775)

Artillery (Bruckmann)
Sinclair’s Foot Battery (6x 9-pdr)

Histories are split on whether Kruse’s brigade was part of 6th Division or a separate command. The point is moot, as the division commander (Cole) was not present on the field and the division’s components fought separately: Lambert and Kruse at the direction of Wellington, Best with Picton.

Brunswick Corps (Ollermann; 4,875 infantry in 8 battalions, 925 cavalry in 4 squadrons, 16 cannon in 2 batteries)

Advance Guard (575)

Light Brigade (Buttlar; 4/2,550)
Leib (Lifeguard) Battalion (575)
1st Light Bn (575)
2nd Light Bn (700)
3rd Light Bn (700)

Line Brigade (Specht; 3/1,750)
1st Line Bn (625)
2nd Line Bn (500)
3rd Line Bn (625)

Cavalry (von Cramm)
Hussars (3/700)
Uhlans (225)

Artillery (Mahn)
Moll’s Foot Battery (8x 6-pdr)
Heinemann’s Horse Battery (8x 6-pdr)

The Brunswickers officially were a corps but in fact the unit was an average-sized division. The cavalry nominally came under the command of Uxbridge and in fact did serve separately on the field. The brigade organization does not appear to have been strictly followed. The advance guard consisted of two companies each of musket-armed light infantry and rifle-armed Jäger, plus a detachment of cavalry. Several battalions were hit hard at Quatre-Bras, but the apportionment of losses here is speculative.
**Reserve Artillery** (Drummond; 12 cannon in 2 batteries)
- Bean’s Horse Battery (6x 9-pdr)
- Ross’ Horse Battery (6x 9-pdr)

**Cavalry** (Uxbridge; 9,425 cavalry in 69 squadrons, 35 cannon in 6 batteries)
- The Netherlands Cavalry Division and the Hanoverian Brigade may or may not have been part of Uxbridge’s official command, but both came under his control on the field.

**1st “Household” Brigade** (Somerset; 13/1,300)
- 1st Life Guards (3/250)
- 2nd Life Guards (3/225)
- Royal Horse Guards “Blues” (3/250)
- 1st Dragoon Guards (4/575)

**2nd “Union” Brigade** (Ponsonby; 9/1,400)
- 1st Dragoons “Royals” (3/425)
- 2nd Dragoons “Scots Greys” (3/450)
- 6th Dragoons “Inniskillings” (3/525)

**3rd Brigade** (Dörnberg; 11/1,425)
- 23rd Light Dragoons (3/350)
- 1st KGL Light Dragoons (4/550)
- 2nd KGL Light Dragoons (4/525)

**4th Brigade** (Vandeleur; 9/1,325)
- 11th Light Dragoons (3/450)
- 12th Light Dragoons (3/425)
- 16th Light Dragoons (3/450)

**5th Brigade** (Grant; 9/1,275)
- 7th Hussars (3/375)
- 15th Hussars (3/450)
- 13th Light Dragoons (3/450)

**6th Brigade** (Vivian; 10/1,500)
- 10th Hussars (3/450)
- 18th Hussars (3/450)
- 1st KGL Hussars (4/600)

**7th Brigade** (Arentschildt; 4/700)
- 3rd KGL Hussars (4/700)

**Horse Artillery** (MacDonald)
- Bull’s Horse Battery (6x 5.5-inch howitzers)
- Gardiner’s Horse Battery (6x 6-pdr)
- Mercer’s Horse Battery (6x 9-pdr)
- Ramsay’s Horse Battery (6x 9-pdr)
- Webber-Smith’s Horse Battery (6x 6-pdr)
- Whinnyates 2nd Rocket Troop RHA (5x 6-pdr, 1 section of Congreve Rockets in place of the usual howitzer)

**1st Hanoverian Cavalry Brigade** (part)
- Duke of Cumberland’s Hussars (4/500)

**Netherlands’ Cavalry Division** (de Collaert; 3,300 cavalry in 23 squadrons, 8 cannon in 2 battery that fought as two half batteries)

**Heavy Brigade** (Tripp; 9/1,250)
- 1st (Dutch) Carabiniers (3/450)
- 2nd (Belgian) Carabiniers (3/400)
- 3rd (Dutch) Carabiniers (3/400)

**1st Light Brigade** (Ghigny; 7/1,100)
- 4th (Dutch) Light Dragoons (4/650)
- 8th (Belgian) Hussars (3/450)

**2nd Light Brigade** (Merlen; 7/950)
- 5th (Belgian) Light Dragoons (3/400)
- 6th (Dutch) Hussars (4/550)

**Artillery**
- Pittius’ (Dutch) Horse Half-Battery (4x 6-pdr)
- Petter’s (Dutch) Horse Half-Battery (4x 6-pdr)

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**ARMY OF THE LOWER RHINE**

The Prussian army had experienced a rebirth after the disaster of 1806, and was in many ways the most modern in the world, the beginning of a German ascendency in land warfare that would last a century.

The first major innovation was the beginning of the form soon to be adopted throughout Europe, that of a standing army backed by large trained reserves. In peacetime, the cadre of the regular army would be used to train conscripts called up in annual classes, then passed to the reserve after a year or two of service. In time of war, the reserves would be called up, expanding the army to several times its peacetime strength. The system was in its infancy in 1815, so few reserves were available. In their place, Landwehr (militia regiments were activated. Not yet composed of older men who had passed through the active army and reserves, the Landwehr generally were young and inexperienced, though most units had a cadre of veterans.

Complicating the reorganization of the army was the accession of a large swath of western Germany as Prussia’s reward for the victory over Napoleon in 1814. The western Germans had little love for the Prussians and the transition into Prussian soldiers did not always go smoothly, especially in Saxony.

On Napoleon’s escape from Elba, Prussia mobilized her full strength, a total of seven corps. Nominally each corps had about 28,000 infantry, 3,000 to 4,000 cavalry, and 80 or more cannon. This theoretical strength was beyond the capacity of Prussia, poor to begin with and worn out by decades of war. Even with British subsidies, total strength did not approach 200,000 men, with even greater shortages of more expensive cavalry and artillery. Not only combat arms were incomplete: the army suffered widespread deficiencies of uniforms, equipment, wagons, and supplies of every kind.

Only four corps could be brought up to anything like full strength, particularly in cavalry and artillery. These four went to Belgium to form Blücher’s field army, though a quarter of their manpower was uncertain westerners. The other three remained in Prussia, ostensibly completing mobilization but in fact watching the Austrians and Russians. The lion’s share of regular troops were with Blücher, the glaring exception being very best Prussian troops, the Guards and Grenadiers. Even so, 23 of Blücher’s 46 infantry regiments and 19 of 35 cavalry regiments were Landwehr. The percentages were considerably higher in the corps remaining in Prussia.
Only a portion of Blücher’s full strength of 120,000 reached the battlefield in time to take part in the fighting:

- 41,375 infantry in 61½ battalions
- 7,450 cavalry in 61 squadrons
- 134 cannon in 17 batteries

| Unit Ratio: 3.6 battalions to 3.6 squadrons to 1 battery | Cavalry Ratio: 180 per 1,000 infantry | Artillery Ratio: 2.8 cannon per 1,000 combatants |

The numbers above are slightly skewed by the fact the Prussians tended to lead with their infantry, keeping artillery and cavalry reserves toward the rear of marching columns. The forces reaching the battlefield therefore were infantry-heavy.

**HIGH COMMAND**

One of the key advantages of the Prussian army over all other armies in the world at the time was its staff system. There were three critical components of the system.

First was the imposition of staffs at every level of command. A traditional army like Napoleon’s had a staff only at the army level; at each other level of its hierarchy the commander was assisted only by a few aides. While one of them might carry the title of chief-of-staff, he actually was little more than a secretary.

Second was the standardization of staff functions—operations and training, logistics, intelligence, personnel—and the assignment of specially-trained officers to execute them. This alone freed commanders to focus on planning and strategy, where men like Wellington and Napoleon had to expend considerable time and effort attending to minutiae, usually by dictating instructions to an aide. It also meant that even an inexperienced commander—for example, a royal prince—could be assigned to a command without causing operational effectiveness to suffer.

Third, most importantly and most uniquely Prusso-German, the various staff officers in the army were part of a separate establishment, the General Staff. Although each was subordinate to his commander, each also answered to higher authorities through the national staff structure. This ensured rapid reporting and dissemination of information, and coordination of various units. It also meant the command structure could survive the loss of a commander, since the staff officers knew all the details about their organization’s status and mission. When Blücher was incapacitated at Ligny on 16 June, the army continued to operate smoothly (adjusting that term to account for a withdrawal by a defeated army).

The staff system was a boon to a man like Field-Marshal Gebhard Leberecht von Blücher. A hussar at heart, he had no head for the vital technicalities of running an army. What he did possess was the courage of a lion harnessed to an abiding hatred of Napoleon and all things French. He was the very man for a war of maneuver, where speed of reaction was a critical element in the battlefield efficiency of the Prussian army and its German descendant.

**INFANTRY**

The standard infantry organization was the regiment of three battalions with four companies of up to 200 men. The first two battalions (I and II) were called musketeers, or line infantry. In theory, each musketeer battalion had a fifth company of grenadiers, but these had been detached to form separate grenadier battalions collected into a corps with the Guards; the detachment eventually would be made permanent with the formation of all-grenadier regiments. Unlike most armies, there was no denominated light company; instead, every third man (who formed the third rank of the company in battle) was skirmish-trained. In addition, the regiment’s third battalion was entirely composed of light infantry, named Fusiliers rather than numbered (e.g. F/12 is the Fusilier battalion of the 12th Regiment).

By the time of the battle, the army possessed 31 regular infantry regiments, but the number is deceptive. Only the first 12 were actual standing regiments. The 13th through 24th had been formed by changing the nomenclature of erstwhile reserve regiments (1st Reserve through 12th Reserve, respectively). Five of the remaining seven had been formed by incorporating Freikorps (private, volunteer units) left over from the war of 1813-1814. Two more were raised by adopting whole cloth two regiments from the newly acquired province of Berg. A 32nd regiment was to have been formed the same way out of Saxons, but was stillborn when the Saxons mutinied. Only a third of Blücher’s infantry was regular or reserve; the rest was either Landwehr, recently formed, or non-Prussian.

The Landwehr regiments that fleshed out the army were organized similarly, except most did not have a light-trained battalion; their third battalions were numbered “III.” Blücher ordered these regiments to train a Fusilier battalion, but the process had just begun when the campaign opened.

Two or three regiments formed a brigade. The regiments themselves were not used as part of the operational command hierarchy, the brigade commander controlling all nine battalions directly. He was assisted in this by the senior regimental commander acting as infantry commandant, seconded by the other regimental commanders. This freed the brigade

**CORPS**

The defeat of 1806 brought home to the Prussian army the need to adopt the French corps, an all-arms organization capable of independent action. On the face of it, the French and Prussian corps were similar, though the Prussian was more regularized. Each had four infantry brigades, a cavalry reserve, and an artillery reserve. One battery and one or two squadrons generally were assigned to each infantry brigade, but more could be added when circumstances dictated.

The Prussian corps differed from the French in two crucial aspects. First, it was stronger in both cavalry and artillery relative to the infantry. This is because while Napoleon commanded an entire army and could form large reserves of both arms, the Prussian field army was divided among several different Allied armies. The corps was therefore the largest Prussian organization, and all assets were shared out evenly amongst the corps. The lack of a central reserve did hamper certain aspects of Prussian battle techniques, but it meant each corps truly was a miniature army.

The second major difference is that the Prussian corps was intended from the beginning to fight as an intact formation, where Napoleon frequently shifted units back and forth between his various corps commanders. Each corps commander therefore was responsible for his own portion of the fighting, leaving Blücher free to focus on the entire battle, where Napoleon had to concern himself more with tailoring his corps to their assignments. This decentralization of authority would develop still further during the nineteenth century and was a critical element in the battlefield efficiency of the Prussian army and its German descendant.
commander to coordinate the brigade’s cooperation with neighboring units, and to supervise the employment of attached units and reserves.

Battalions did not necessarily operate as a single mass. Pairs of companies frequently would be detached for specific missions, or combined with a pair from another battalion to form a maneuver group under a field officer.

The brigade as a whole was intended to act as a cohesive force on the battlefield, focused on a single primary combat. It would use its light infantry to establish a skirmish line while several battalions formed a firing line. The firing line would be supported by any attached artillery, and fed by fresh companies from reserve battalions until fire superiority was achieved. At that time reserves would be sent forward to seize the contested ground. The doctrine would survive with only minor modifications into the opening months of World War I.

CAVALRY

The corps cavalry reserve consisted of between six and ten cavalry regiments. Nominally they were grouped into two or three brigades, but the brigade structure seems to have been flexible. The regular cavalry regiments were divided by type into heavy (cuirassiers and dragoons, the latter being heavy cavalry in the Prussian service) and light (hussars and lancers, the latter called Uhlans). The light cavalry, well-mounted and well-trained, formed the backbone of the cavalry. All the cuirassiers were retained at home, so heavy shock action in Blücher’s army fell to its few dragoon regiments.

The numerous Landwehr cavalry regiments were indifferently mounted and trained, just adequate for scouting and screening but outclassed in combat by most other cavalry. As a result of these shortcomings, the Prussian cavalry had less impact in battle than its numbers would suggest, though it did prove effective in the pursuit after the battle.

ARTILLERY

Each corps was assigned up to twelve batteries. Like the French, the corps had an artillery commander with the authority to concentrate cannon into an independent mass or attach them to the various brigades as circumstances dictated.

The standard artillery unit was the foot battery with six 6-pounder cannon and a pair of light howitzers. As a rule, one such battery was assigned to each brigade on a regular basis, with one or two more assigned to the corps reserve.

Horse batteries were identical to the foot batteries, except the cannoneers were mounted. One or more horse batteries generally accompanied the cavalry reserve, but a battery also could be assigned to an infantry brigade on advance- or rear-guard duty.

Each corps also had a number of position batteries, built around 12-pounder cannon and heavier howitzers. These were intended to provide the corps with a strong base of fire around which the brigades could maneuver. Individual position batteries could be assigned to brigades, but this was not done normally as the batteries were so slow.

In raw numbers, the Prussian artillery was plentiful with a good weight of fire. However, training and equipment were lacking so the overall effect on the battle was less than it might have been.

UNITs OF THE ARMY OF THE LOWER RHINE

The first name under each command is the commander of the unit. The second name in each infantry brigade is its infantry commandant (the senior regimental commander). Additional names in the cavalry reserves are brigade commanders.

ZIETEN’S FIRST CORPS

5,425 infantry in 9½ battalions
2,250 cavalry in 20 squadrons
24 cannon in 3 batteries

1st Brigade (Steinmetz & Kleist; 5,425 infantry in 9½ battalions, 8 cannon in 1 battery)
12th Infantry (3/1,875)
24th Infantry (3/1,850)
1st Westphalian Landwehr (3/1,475)
Silesian Jäger (½ - 225)
7th Foot Battery (8x 6-pdr)

Reserve Cavalry (Röder & Tresckow; 2,250 cavalry in 20 squadrons, 16 cannon in 2 batteries)
2nd Dragoons (4/400)
5th Dragoons (3/500)
4th Hussars (3/400)
3rd Uhlans (4/425)
6th Uhlans (2/275)
2nd Kurmark Landwehr Cavalry (4/250)
2nd Horse Battery (8x 6-pdr)
7th Horse Battery (8x 6-pdr)

Zieten’s 2nd and 3rd Brigades, reserve artillery, and remaining cavalry reached the battlefield too late to get into action. His 4th Brigade never made it, having become embroiled at Wavre.

PIRCH’S SECOND CORPS

11,550 infantry in 18 battalions
1,450 cavalry in 12 squadrons
16 cannon in 2 batteries

5th Brigade (Tippelskirch & Robel; 6,025 infantry, including 500 volunteer Jäger, in 9 battalions, 8 cannon in 1 battery)
2nd Infantry (3/2,375)
25th Infantry (3/2,050)
5th Westphalian Landwehr (3/1,600)
10th Foot Battery (8x 6-pdr)

The Volunteer Jäger were units raised privately after the outbreak of war, and contained men who generally had not gone through formal training. Poorly suited to the battle line, they were enthusiastic and dedicated and served well in independent action.

6th Brigade (Krafft & Bismarck; 5,525 infantry in 9 battalions, 8 cannon in 1 battery)
9th Infantry (3/2,025)
26th Infantry (3/1,575)
1st Elbe Landwehr (3/1,925)
5th Foot Battery (8x 6-pdr)

Cavalry (Wahlen-Jürgass & Schulenburg; 1,450 cavalry in 12 squadrons)
1st Dragoons (4/575)
2nd Uhlans (4/425)
5th Kurmark Landwehr Cavalry (4/425)

The remainder of the corps, 7th and 8th Brigades, reserve artillery, and most of the cavalry, reached the field as the fighting ended.
BÜLOW’S FOURTH CORPS

24,300 infantry in 34 battalions
3,750 cavalry in 29 squadrons
94 cannon in 12 batteries

13th Brigade (Hacke & Lettow; 6,825 infantry in 9 battalions, 8 cannon in 1 battery)
10th Infantry (3/2,400)
2nd Neumark Landwehr (3/2,075)
3rd Neumark Landwehr (3/2,350)
21st Foot Battery (8x 6-pdr)

14th Brigade (Ryssel & Funck; 5,475 infantry in 7 battalions, 8 cannon in 1 battery)
11th Infantry (2/1,425)
1st Pomeranian Landwehr (2/1,625)
2nd Pomeranian Landwehr (3/2,425)
13th Foot Battery (8x 6-pdr)

15th Brigade (Losthin & Lobell; 6,125 infantry in 9 battalions, 8 cannon in 1 battery)
18th Infantry (3/2,400)
3rd Silesian Landwehr (3/1,950)
4th Silesian Landwehr (3/1,775)
14th Foot Battery (8x 6-pdr)

16th Brigade (Hiller & Creilsheim; 5,975 infantry in 9 battalions, 8 cannon in 1 battery)
15th Infantry (3/2,450)
1st Silesian Landwehr (3/1,825)
2nd Silesian Landwehr (3/1,700)
2nd Foot Battery (8x 6-pdr)

Cavalry Reserve (Prinz Wilhelm, Schwerin, Watzdorff, & Sydow; 3,750 cavalry in 29 squadrons, 14 cannon in 2 batteries)
8th Dragoons (3/400)
6th Hussars (3/425)
8th Hussars (3/450)
1st Uhlans (4/650)
1st Neumark Landwehr Cavalry (3/375)
2nd Neumark Landwehr Cavalry (3/425)
1st Pomeranian Landwehr Cavalry (3/300)
2nd Silesian Landwehr Cavalry (4/425)
3rd Silesian Landwehr Cavalry (3/300)
1st Horse Battery (6x 6-pdr)
12th Horse Battery (8x 6-pdr)

Artillery Reserve (Bardeleben; 6 batteries with 48 cannon)
3rd Position Battery (8x 12-pdr)
5th Position Battery (8x 12-pdr)
13th Position Battery (8x 12-pdr)
11th Foot Battery (8x 6-pdr)
11th Horse Battery (8x 6-pdr)
4th Howitzer Battery (8x 7-pdr howitzers)

In addition to the detachment of the 10th Hussars noted above, the 2nd Pomeranian Landwehr Cavalry and 1st Silesian Landwehr had become involved in the fighting at Wavre. One squadron from each of the 3rd Silesian Landwehr Cavalry and 6th Hussars were on separate scouting missions south of the battlefield; both would reach the Charleroi-Brussels road behind the French, but with too little combat power to achieve anything useful.